The Senate's General Secretariat denied the request filed by Wadith Manzur to be sworn in virtually or to take the oath at the Police Cavalry School, where he remains deprived of liberty in the corruption case involving the National Disaster Risk Management Unit — UNGRD.
The decision, made known on July 29, 2026, holds that the Constitution and Law 5 of 1992 do not authorize a member of Congress to be sworn in remotely or outside the seat of Congress. The response leaves Wadith Manzur facing a different scenario from the one his defense initially proposed: he was elected senator, has not been convicted and retains the presumption of innocence, but cannot begin exercising the seat because he has not taken the oath required by legislative rules.
Wadith Manzur's case does not end with the Senate's administrative denial. The next question will be whether the impossibility of being sworn in within the constitutional term constitutes force majeure and, therefore, prevents the loss of his office.
What Wadith Manzur asked the Senate
Wadith Manzur's defense asked Congress to allow his swearing-in through one of two extraordinary mechanisms.
The first consisted of a virtual connection with the Police Cavalry School so that Wadith Manzur could take the oath from his place of detention. The second proposed that the Senate's Board or competent officials travel to that facility to carry out the swearing-in there.
The petition sought to preserve the seat Wadith Manzur won in the March 8, 2026 legislative elections. The Conservative leader received approximately 135,000 votes and was one of his party's most-voted candidates. Days after the election, the Supreme Court's Instruction Chamber ordered his pretrial detention.
The defense explained that the request did not seek to have Wadith Manzur legislate from prison. Its goal was for him to be able to take office and then be subject to the suspension arising from the pretrial measure, preserving the possibility of exercising the seat if he regained his liberty during the constitutional term.
Why the Senate denied Wadith Manzur's swearing-in
The Senate's General Secretariat concluded that no rule allows Wadith Manzur to be sworn in virtually or at a detention facility.
Article 17 of Law 5 of 1992 provides that the president of the Preparatory Board administers the oath to members of Congress present, and that this act is a prerequisite for exercising their duties. The rule is built around a swearing-in carried out before the corporation and does not contemplate a remote modality.
The Senate also invoked Article 140 of the Constitution, under which Congress has its seat in the nation's capital. Based on that provision and constitutional case law, the General Secretariat understood that the oath must be administered at the institutional seat and before the competent legislative authority.
The use of digital tools in certain parliamentary sessions did not resolve Wadith Manzur's case either. For the Senate, the rules allowing remote participation in certain legislative activities did not extend that possibility to the solemn act of a lawmaker's swearing-in.
The conclusion was categorical: Wadith Manzur cannot take the oath virtually, nor demand that the Senate move the swearing-in act to the Cavalry School.
The denial does not mean Wadith Manzur has already lost his office
The Senate's response prevents Wadith Manzur's swearing-in for now, but does not automatically declare the loss of his office.
Numeral 3 of Article 183 of the Constitution establishes, as grounds for loss of office, failing to take the oath within eight days of the chambers' installation or of the date on which the member of Congress was called to be sworn in. The same provision excepts cases where force majeure is present.
Article 296 of Law 5 of 1992 reproduces that ground and the force majeure exception.
However, neither the General Secretariat nor the Board can directly strip Wadith Manzur of his office. That power belongs to the Council of State, through a judicial proceeding in which the elements of the ground must be proven and the right of defense guaranteed.
Case law requires establishing, among other things, that the elected official did not take office within the term, that the omission was not covered by force majeure, and that there was intent or fault in his conduct. For that reason, the expiration of the term does not by itself automatically strip the seat.
The decisive point: whether Wadith Manzur's detention constitutes force majeure
The most important legal dispute is no longer whether the Senate could invent a virtual swearing-in. That possibility has been ruled out.
The question now is whether Wadith Manzur's pretrial detention, combined with his inability to leave the detention facility, constitutes force majeure for purposes of Article 183 of the Constitution.
Force majeure generally requires an unforeseeable or irresistible event that prevents fulfilling an obligation and is not attributable to the person invoking it. Here, the defense can argue that Wadith Manzur duly expressed his intention to be sworn in, requested alternatives before the term expired, and has no control over the physical restriction preventing him from appearing at the Capitol.
That argument matters because the constitutional ground does not simply penalize the material failure to take office. It also requires assessing whether the conduct can be legally attributed to the elected official.
Council of State case law has recognized that force majeure can bar loss of office when the elected official shows that an external, irresistible circumstance beyond their control prevented them from taking the oath. It has also required verifying the subjective element of intent or fault.
The opposing thesis will argue that Wadith Manzur's deprivation of liberty is not entirely unrelated to his legal situation, but rather the result of a reasoned judicial decision within a criminal proceeding. From that perspective, it must also be examined whether the elected official could have foreseen that the pretrial measure would interfere with his swearing-in, and whether he pursued every available avenue to overcome the obstacle.
The answer cannot be anticipated. It will fall to the Council of State to determine whether the detention meets, in this specific case, the elements of force majeure.
Wadith Manzur is charged, but not convicted
The Supreme Court's Instruction Chamber charged Wadith Manzur and other members of Congress with improper bribery, within the investigation related to the UNGRD. The same ruling imposed pretrial detention against Wadith Manzur and Karen Astrith Manrique Olarte.
The charge alleges that members of the Interparliamentary Public Credit Committee accepted benefits in exchange for compromising their congressional duties. This is a hypothesis that must be proven during trial, not a definitive finding of responsibility.
For that reason, Wadith Manzur retains the presumption of innocence. A pretrial measure is precautionary in nature and does not equate to a criminal conviction.
Nonetheless, the presumption of innocence does not eliminate the legal effects of the pretrial measure. While it remains in force, Wadith Manzur is subject to a legitimate restriction on his freedom of movement and cannot leave the detention facility without authorization from the competent authority.
The legal question, then, is not deciding in advance whether Wadith Manzur is guilty. It is reconciling his status as an elected official with a precautionary measure that prevents him from appearing at the place where the law requires taking the oath.
Wadith Manzur's earlier suspension does not automatically carry over to the Senate
When the Court imposed the pretrial measure, Wadith Manzur was still serving as a representative in the House for the 2022-2026 term.
Article 359 of Law 600 of 2000 provides that when a pretrial measure is imposed against a public servant, the judicial officer must request the competent authority to suspend that person from office.
In compliance with that rule, the decision affected the seat Wadith Manzur then held in the House of Representatives.
However, his new election to the Senate corresponds to a different constitutional term and a different chamber. The earlier suspension should not be described as if it had automatically produced the suspension of a Senate seat that Wadith Manzur has not yet begun to exercise.
To perform the duties of senator, he would first have to take the oath. Only afterward could the suspension of the new office be formally raised as a consequence of the pretrial measure still in force.
This distinction explains the defense's strategy: swear in Wadith Manzur to preserve the seat, then suspend him immediately while he remains deprived of liberty.
Swearing-in is not a mere formality
Wadith Manzur's swearing-in cannot be reduced to a formality without consequences.
The oath provided for in Article 17 of Law 5 of 1992 is a prerequisite for a member of Congress to exercise their duties. Without being sworn in, Wadith Manzur cannot participate in sessions, vote on bills, take part in debates, validly serve on committees, or exercise any other powers inherent to the Senate.
That does not mean the oath is the exclusive source of the mandate. Election, the electoral declaration and the credential legally precede the oath. The Council of State has explained that a person must have been elected, called or appointed before being able to be sworn in.
The most precise formulation is that his election gave Wadith Manzur the status of senator-elect, while the swearing-in is the requirement needed to begin exercising the office.
The Karen Manrique precedent
Wadith Manzur's situation has a close precedent in the case of Karen Manrique, also charged in the UNGRD investigation and deprived of liberty.
The Supreme Court denied a request related to her attendance at the installation of Congress. That precedent confirms that the judicial authority does not consider popular election to automatically eliminate the effects of a pretrial measure.
However, the decision on Wadith Manzur had a different component. His petition was not limited to requesting a temporary release; it proposed a virtual swearing-in or the relocation of legislative authorities to the detention facility.
The General Secretariat directly addressed that regulatory problem and concluded that neither modality is authorized.
The cases of Karen Manrique and Wadith Manzur share the UNGRD context and the physical impossibility of appearing before Congress, but the eventual loss of office must be analyzed individually. Force majeure, the diligence displayed and the attributability of the failure are personal matters that cannot be resolved through an automatic rule applied to all defendants.
What happens now to Wadith Manzur's seat
The seat won by Wadith Manzur cannot be exercised by him while he is not sworn in.
Nor should it be stated definitively, at this stage, that the seat has been lost or that it must immediately be filled by the next candidate on the Conservative Party's list. First, the legal consequences of the failure to take office and the possible existence of force majeure must be determined.
The Council of State is the authority called to decide a request for loss of office. The corporation's Board or any citizen may bring that proceeding, but the decision requires a judicial ruling.
In that scenario, Wadith Manzur's defense will be able to show that:
- he expressly stated his intention to be sworn in;
- he proposed alternatives before the term expired;
- the denial stemmed from the interpretation adopted by the Senate;
- and physical appearance was impossible for him due to a judicial measure he could not disregard.
Whoever seeks the loss of office may respond that detention does not eliminate the constitutional duty to be sworn in, and that Wadith Manzur's procedural situation does not satisfy the requirements of unforeseeability, irresistibility and absence of fault required to establish force majeure.
What the Senate actually decided
The Senate's decision has a more limited scope than some headlines suggest.
The Senate did not find Wadith Manzur guilty, did not annul his election, and did not decree the loss of his office. Nor did it definitively resolve whether his detention constitutes force majeure.
The General Secretariat decided only that current law does not allow administering the oath by videoconference or moving the swearing-in act to the Cavalry School.
Wadith Manzur's case now moves from a regulatory dispute to a judicial one. The point is no longer how he could be sworn in from prison, but what legal consequence follows from his being unable to do so within the constitutional term.
Conclusion
Wadith Manzur was elected senator, retains the presumption of innocence and has not automatically lost his political rights. But those circumstances do not grant him the right to choose a form of swearing-in that the Constitution and Law 5 of 1992 do not contemplate.
The Senate denied the virtual swearing-in and the administration of the oath at the place of detention. That decision prevents Wadith Manzur from beginning to exercise the seat, but does not by itself resolve whether he must lose his office.
The final decision will depend on a proceeding before the Council of State and, especially, on the assessment of force majeure. There it must be established whether the pretrial detention was an irresistible obstacle that excludes any reproach for the failure to take office, or whether the ground provided for in Article 183 of the Constitution was met despite the requests made by the defense.
Wadith Manzur has no right to be sworn in through any modality he chooses, but neither can he lose his office without a judicial decision that examines force majeure and the fault attributable to his conduct.
Main source: General Secretariat of the Senate of the Republic, decision of July 29, 2026; Colombian Constitution, Articles 140 and 183; Law 5 of 1992; Law 600 of 2000, Article 359.